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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
Raheem Jacobs got into a fight with another inmate 
while he was a pretrial detainee at Cumberland County Jail. 
Several minutes after the fight, a group of corrections officers 
forcibly removed him from the dorm. Jacobs claims that as the 
officers removed him, they violated his Fourteenth 
Amendment right to be free from excessive force amounting to 
punishment. The officers moved for summary judgment on the 
ground of qualified immunity. After reviewing the record 
(including a security video from the dorm) the District Court 
determined that a reasonable jury could find that the officers 
used gratuitous force and that any reasonable officer would 
have known that such force was unlawful. The court thus 
denied qualified immunity and summary judgment to the 
officers. One of the officers, Michael Williams, unsuccessfully 
moved for reconsideration. Williams now appeals. We will 
affirm both District Court orders. 
I 
Jacobs was held in the C dorm of Cumberland County 
Jail as he awaited trial for a weapons charge. On the morning 
of February 25, 2015, Jacobs got into a fight with Bruce Hanby, 
one of the other inmates housed in the C dorm. Less than thirty 
seconds after the fight ended, a group of corrections officers 
entered the dorm and identified Hanby as one of the fighters. 
The officers removed Hanby and took him to the medical unit. 
About fifteen minutes later, Williams and four of his fellow 
officers (Neil Armstrong, Michael Anderson, Emanual 





the officers arrived, they found Jacobs in the shower. The 
officers told Jacobs to finish showering, get dressed, and gather 
his belongings so that they could take him to the medical unit. 
As they waited for Jacobs to finish up, the officers 
standing outside the shower talked and laughed together while 
other officers chatted with the inmates. After a few minutes, 
Jacobs exited the shower and returned to his bunk. He donned 
his jumpsuit and then rummaged through items on his bed for 
about thirty seconds. The officers continued chatting with each 
other in an apparently casual manner, but eventually their focus 
shifted back to Jacobs. Officer Williams started speaking in the 
direction of Jacobs as Jacobs continued to look through papers 
and items on his bed. Then, in an instant, Officer Armstrong 
grabbed Jacobs and pulled him away from the bed as Williams 
and Anderson approached. 
The parties dispute what prompted the officers to 
descend on Jacobs. Jacobs claims that he was shuffling through 
papers and searching for his family’s phone numbers so that 
his bunkmate could call the family and let them know what 
happened. While Jacobs doesn’t recall exactly what he and the 
officers said, he posits that the officers grabbed him because 
he was “taking too long.” App. 153.  
The officers tell a different story. Armstrong says that 
he asked Jacobs if he was looking for a weapon and Jacobs 
replied, “Maybe.” App. 217. Williams never mentioned a 
weapon in his deposition, but his story is similar. He claims 
that after he saw Jacobs shuffling through the papers, he said, 
“[M]y man, get your stuff together, let’s go,” and immediately 
approached the bed to get a better view of what Jacobs was 





what he had in his hand and Jacobs responded with “something 
to the effect of F you guys, . . . you guys are crazy.” App. 191. 
The jail security video recorded no audio, so we cannot 
determine what was said. But what happened next is clear from 
the video. After being grabbed by Armstrong, Jacobs did not 
resist as Armstrong tried to handcuff him. As Jacobs stood 
compliant with his hands behind his back, Williams 
approached and stood face to face with Jacobs. Within seconds, 
Williams delivered a strike to Jacobs’s neck and a punch to the 
side of his head. After the first two blows, Armstrong put 
Jacobs into a neck hold and forced him to the floor as Williams 
delivered a backhand slap to Jacobs’s face. 
The security video failed to fully capture the next two 
portions of the incident. First, as Armstrong and Jacobs 
tumbled to the floor, they fell out of the security camera’s view. 
The video shows Officer Anderson dropping to the floor to 
assist Armstrong, but it does not capture Armstrong’s and 
Anderson’s actions during the twenty-second period that 
Jacobs remained on the floor. According to Jacobs, the officers 
pinned him to the floor and punched and kneed him as they 
cuffed his hands behind his back. Second, as Officers Morrero 
and Armstrong escorted Jacobs to the medical unit, they used 
an elevator with no security camera. Jacobs alleges that as his 
hands were still cuffed behind his back the officers threw him 
face-first into the elevator wall and continued beating him. 
On the day of the incident, each officer submitted a use-
of-force report. None of the reports mentioned a threat of a 
weapon or Williams striking Jacobs. Jail and law-enforcement 
officials opened an investigation and determined that Williams 
used excessive force. After review, the Cumberland County 





Jacobs sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 
alleged, among other things, that the officers used excessive 
force in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.1 The officers moved for summary judgment on the 
ground of qualified immunity. At summary judgment, a district 
court must construe the evidence and draw all reasonable 
inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion. Bland v. City of Newark, 900 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 
2018). In qualified-immunity cases, that “usually means 
adopting . . . the plaintiff’s version of the facts,” Scott v. Harris, 
550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007), unless “no reasonable jury could 
believe it,” id. at 380. But the existence of a security video 
presents an “added wrinkle.” Id. at 378. In cases where there is 
a reliable video depicting the events in question, courts must 
not adopt a version of the facts that is “blatantly contradicted” 
by the video footage. Id. at 380. 
Applying those standards, the court first analyzed 
Williams’s conduct. The court noted that several documents 
from the investigation suggested that Williams’s force was 
excessive. And far from blatantly contradicting Jacobs’s 
version of events, the District Court found that the security 
video appeared largely consistent with Jacobs’s side of the 
story.  
 
1 Jacobs also filed a § 1983 conspiracy claim against the 
officers. The District Court denied summary judgment on the 
conspiracy claim for Officers Anderson, Armstrong, 
Velesquez, and Williams. Because the conspiracy claim was 
not addressed in the appellate briefing, we consider the issue 






The remaining officers fared no better. Because the 
security video failed to capture (1) what Jacobs, Williams, and 
Armstrong said before the incident; (2) what happened on the 
floor of C dorm; and (3) what happened on the elevator, the 
court adopted Jacobs’s version of those disputed events. Using 
that version of the facts, the District Court concluded that each 
use of force violated Jacobs’s constitutional rights2 and that 
any reasonable officer would have known that such gratuitous 
force violated clearly established law. After unsuccessfully 
moving for reconsideration, Officer Williams timely 
appealed.3  
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s 
denial of qualified immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the 
collateral-order doctrine. Bland, 900 F.3d at 82. Under the 
collateral-order doctrine, we have jurisdiction to “review 
whether the set of facts identified by the district court is 
sufficient to establish a violation of a clearly established 
constitutional right.” Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 772 
F.3d 979, 986 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Ziccardi v. City of 
Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 57, 61 (3d Cir. 2002)). But we lack 
jurisdiction to “review questions of ‘evidence sufficiency.’” 
 
2 The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Officer Velesquez because it was undisputed that he never 
touched Jacobs during the incident. 
3 The other officers failed to timely appeal. Although they 
moved to join Williams’s briefing in this case, they never filed 
a notice of appeal. Accordingly, they are not parties to this 
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(A); Torres v. Oakland 





Blaylock v. City of Philadelphia, 504 F.3d 405, 409 (3d Cir. 
2007) (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995)). 
“That is, if a district court determines ‘that there is sufficient 
record evidence to support a set of facts under which there 
would be no immunity,’ we must accept that set of facts on 
interlocutory review.” Id. (quoting Schieber v. City of 
Philadelphia, 320 F.3d 409, 415 (3d Cir. 2007)). We will thus 
accept the District Court’s rendering of the facts unless it is 
“blatantly contradicted” by the security video. Scott, 550 U.S. 
at 380.  
Given that set of facts, we analyze Officer Williams’s 
qualified-immunity defense de novo. Bland, 900 F.3d at 83. 
Our qualified-immunity analysis consists of two questions: 
(1) whether this set of facts shows Williams violating a 
constitutional right, and (2) “whether the right was clearly 
established, such that ‘it would [have been] clear to a 
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful.’” El v. City 
of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 334 (3d Cir. 2020) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 182 
(3d Cir. 2011)). 
III 
 Before we can decide whether the evidence depicts a 
violation of a constitutional right, we must first clarify what 
constitutional provision governs Jacobs’s claims. The Fourth 
Amendment protects citizens from objectively unreasonable 
uses of force in the context of arrests, investigatory stops, or 
any other seizure. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–
97 (1989). And the Eighth Amendment protects convicted 
prisoners from any force applied “maliciously and sadistically 
for the very purpose of causing harm.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 





1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). But it is the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment4 that protects pretrial detainees like 
Jacobs. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). 
In Bell, the Supreme Court explained that “pretrial 
detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, retain 
at least those constitutional rights that we have held are 
enjoyed by convicted prisoners.” Id. at 545 (emphasis added). 
Later, in Graham, the Court explained that it was “clear” that 
the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees from 
“the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” 
Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10. But it was not always clear what 
the punishment standard entailed.  
Courts were left to decide whether the punishment 
standard was objective (like the Fourth Amendment’s 
objective-reasonableness test) or subjective (like the Eighth 
Amendment’s malicious-and-sadistic standard). For example, 
in Fuentes v. Wagner, we held, in part, that “the Eighth 
Amendment cruel and unusual punishments standards . . . 
apply to a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim arising in 
the context of a prison disturbance.” 206 F.3d 335, 347 (3d Cir. 
2000) (citations and emphasis omitted). Thus, in the context of 
a disturbance, we required pretrial detainees to show not only 
that force was excessive, but also that the force was applied 
maliciously and sadistically. Id. In such a case, the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendment inquiries became identical.  
 
4 The Supreme Court has not yet determined whether pretrial 
detainees can bring excessive-force claims under the Fourth 
Amendment. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 408 





In 2015, the Supreme Court clarified that the subjective 
Eighth Amendment standard does not apply to pretrial 
detainees. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400 
(2015). “The language of the two Clauses differs, and the 
nature of the claims often differs. And, most importantly, 
pretrial detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be 
punished at all, much less ‘maliciously and sadistically.’” Id. 
(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 398 n.11). Instead, the Court 
held that “a pretrial detainee must show only that the force 
purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively 
unreasonable.” Id. at 396–97 (emphasis added). The Court thus 
clarified that the Fourteenth Amendment, like the Fourth, 
exclusively employs an objective-reasonableness standard.5  
IV 
A 
Turning to the question of whether Williams used 
objectively unreasonable force, “[a] court (judge or jury) 
cannot apply this standard mechanically.” Id. at 397. Instead, 
it requires “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of 
each particular case.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Those 
circumstances include “the relationship between the need for 
the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the 
plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to 
limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem 
at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and 
whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Kingsley, 576 
 
5 In doing so, the Court abrogated the portion of Fuentes that 
applied the Eighth Amendment’s malicious-and-sadistic 





U.S. at 397. 
We analyze these circumstances “from the perspective 
of a reasonable officer on the scene.” Id. Running a jail is “an 
inordinately difficult undertaking.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 
78, 84–85 (1987). “Safety and order at these institutions 
requires the expertise of correctional officials, who must have 
substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions to the 
problems they face.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 399 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Florence v. Bd. of Chosen 
Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 326 (2012)). Officers facing 
disturbances “are often forced to make split-second 
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and 
rapidly evolving.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397).6 And “[n]ot every push or 
shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a 
judge’s chambers,” violates an inmate’s constitutional rights. 
 
6 As Kingsley demonstrates, courts applying the objective 
standard in the Fourteenth Amendment context may find useful 
guidance in Fourth Amendment excessive-force cases. See 
Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397–400. Although the factual scenarios 
in the two contexts may differ, the Fourteenth Amendment 
standard is now almost identical to the Fourth Amendment 
standard. Compare id. at 396–97 (the Fourteenth Amendment 
excessive-force inquiry requires a pretrial detainee to “show 
only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him 
was objectively unreasonable”), with Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 
(the Fourth Amendment excessive-force inquiry asks “whether 
the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the 
facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to 
their underlying intent or motivation”); see also Lombardo v. 





Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033).  
 Here, even when the circumstances are viewed from the 
perspective of a reasonable officer, the evidence construed in 
the light most favorable to Jacobs could lead a reasonable jury 
to find that Williams used objectively unreasonable force. 
First, jurors could conclude that Williams and his fellow 
officers were not facing a disturbance or any other threat to jail 
security. Although a fight between inmates is a type of jail 
disturbance, the disturbance subsided well before the officers 
returned to retrieve Jacobs.7 After the fight ended, roughly 
fifteen minutes passed before the officers returned for Jacobs. 
When they returned, they found the inmates orderly and 
compliant. Moreover, the security video shows that 
circumstances were calm as the officers waited for Jacobs to 
finish getting ready. 
 A reasonable factfinder could also conclude that Jacobs 
posed no threat throughout the encounter. The security video 
shows that Jacobs was standing with his hands behind his back 
and submitting to Armstrong’s compliance hold when 
Williams approached the bunk. As the District Court observed, 
a reasonable jury viewing the security footage could find that 
Williams struck Jacobs while Jacobs was defenseless and 
obeying orders. 
In sum, this version of events does not present a 
question about the appropriate degree of force. Under this set 
 
7 We note that even though the ongoing-disturbance exception 
in Fuentes was not yet abrogated at the time of the officers’ 
conduct, it would still not apply in this case because there was 





of facts, a jury could find that there was no penological need 
for any additional force—making each of Williams’s strikes 
wholly gratuitous and objectively unreasonable.8 
B 
 As for the second prong of qualified immunity, a 
government official is protected from suit unless he “violated 
a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established 
at the time of the challenged conduct.” Thomas v. Tice, 948 
F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 
U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). “Clearly established means that, at the 
time of the officer’s conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that 
every reasonable official would understand that what he is 
doing is unlawful.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 
577, 589 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).  
In each case, we must focus on “whether the violative 
nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Mullenix 
v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 
 
8 Of course, Williams has his own side of the story. He claims 
that he and his fellow officers perceived a legitimate threat 
because of things Jacobs said. If Williams’s version of events 
were true, that would certainly bear on the reasonableness of 
his actions. But as we have already explained, we must accept 
the District Court’s presentation of the facts in the light most 
favorable to Jacobs unless a video “blatantly contradict[s]” that 
version of the facts. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. Based on the silent 
video, the only thing we can know for sure is that Jacobs and 
Williams exchanged words. The dispute over what was said is 
precisely the type of genuine factual dispute that we lack 





742). Thus, the central question is whether the existing law 
gave the officer “fair warning” that his particular conduct was 
unlawful. Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002)). 
Sometimes an officer can receive fair warning if “a 
general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional 
law . . . appl[ies] with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in 
question, even though ‘the very action in question has [not] 
previously been held unlawful.’” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741 
(quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)). 
But in excessive-force cases, it can be difficult for officers to 
know how previous judicial opinions apply to new, tense 
situations. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001). The 
reasonability of force often hinges on the details of an 
individual case, making the specificity of caselaw “especially 
important.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12. In such cases, “officers 
are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent 
‘squarely governs’ the specific facts at issue.” Kisela v. 
Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018) (quoting Mullenix, 577 
U.S. at 15). The caselaw does not have to be “directly on 
point,” but existing precedent must have placed the question of 
unlawfulness “beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. Cases 
with closely analogous facts can thus help “move a case 
beyond the otherwise ‘hazy border between excessive and 
acceptable force’ and thereby provide an officer notice that a 
specific use of force is unlawful.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153 
(quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 18).  
Here, Williams’s conduct is nowhere near the “hazy 
border between excessive and acceptable force.” Id. (quoting 
Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 18). When the evidence is construed in 
the light most favorable to Jacobs, we have no difficulty 





debate,” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. Any reasonable officer 
would have known that Williams’s strikes were unlawful under 
this set of facts. 
First, the Supreme Court has made clear that officers 
may not expose inmates to gratuitous force divorced from any 
legitimate penological purpose. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 738; 
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). That alone 
would provide officers with at least “some notice” that the 
treatment of Jacobs was unlawful. Hope, 536 U.S. at 745. 
Additionally, the specific conduct here—striking a physically 
restrained and nonthreatening inmate—was clearly unlawful 
under the precedent of this Court and our sister circuits. See 
Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 326 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A]t the 
time of the incident in 2001, it was established that an officer 
may not kick or otherwise use gratuitous force against an 
inmate who has been subdued.”); Estate of Davis v. Delo, 115 
F.3d 1388, 1394–95 (8th Cir. 1997) (“We agree that the law 
was well established that striking an unresisting inmate . . . in 
the head while four other officers were restraining his limbs 
. . . is a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”); Skrtich v. 
Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2002) (“By 1998, 
our precedent clearly established that government officials 
may not use gratuitous force against a prisoner who has been 
already subdued or, as in this case, incapacitated.”); Cowart v. 
Erwin, 837 F.3d 444, 454 (5th Cir. 2016) (“We have little 
difficulty concluding that in 2009, the time of the incident, it 
was well-established, in sufficiently similar situations, that 





has already been subdued . . . [or] incapacitated.’” (alteration 
in original) (quoting Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1303)).9  
* * * 
At the time of the relevant conduct, it was clearly 
established that officers could not gratuitously beat an inmate. 
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Jacobs, 
any reasonable officer would have known that the conduct here 
was unlawful. We will therefore affirm both the District Court 
order denying summary judgment and the District Court order 
denying reconsideration to Officer Williams. 
 
9 These cases arose out of the Eighth Amendment context. 
Together, they show that it was clearly established that 
Williams’s conduct would violate the Eighth Amendment’s 
more stringent malicious-and-sadistic standard. Because the 
conduct would violate that standard, Jacobs’s status as a 
pretrial detainee simply means that the constitutional violation 
here is more obvious because “pretrial detainees (unlike 
convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much less 
‘maliciously and sadistically.’” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 400 
(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 398 n.11). At the time of 
Williams’s conduct, it was clear that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protected pretrial detainees from excessive force 
amounting to punishment. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10. 
But even if a reasonable officer could mistakenly believe that 
the circumstances here were governed by the Eighth 
Amendment standard (as many jail interactions are) it would 
not change the outcome because the conduct would violate 
clearly established law under either standard. 
